



PRICE-FIXING LICENSES TO A PLURALITY OF
COMPANIES IN AN INDUSTRY VIOLATES
THE SHERMAN ACT
Plaintiff, assignee of a process patent for producing a moire1 finish
on textiles,2 licensed two other firms to use the process. Each license con-
tained a provision establishing a minimum price to be charged by the
licensee for imparting the finish on customers' fabrics The licensor and
licensees comprised three of the five moire finishers in the United States.
Plaintiff sued one of the non-licensees for patent infringement. 4  The dis-
trict court denied relief 5 and the circuit court affirmed,6 holding that the
price-fixing provision in the licenses violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.7 Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir.
1956).
The validity of a patentee's attempts to attach conditions to patent
licenses requires a balancing of the patent policy to encourage invention and
disclosure s against the interest of the public in the maintenance of com-
petition in free markets.9 In United States v. General Electric Co.10 the
1. Moire is a watered, clouded or frosted appearance on textile fabric. 1 WnEsRz,
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1579 (2d ed. 1934).
2. The patent, the "H" process, incorporates a moire finish into textiles by moisten-
ing the fabric in confined pattern areas and drying the fabric by heating it under ten-
sion. See findings in the district court opinion of the instant case. Newburgh Moire Co.
v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D.N.J. 1952).
3. The license did not, however, fix the sale price of the moire fabric. Id. at 374.
4. Plaintiff also sued for unfair competition. Defendant denied the unfair competi-
tion and counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the patents were invalid and
that the licenses violated the antitrust laws. Id. at 372.
5. The court denied relief because the price-fixing provisions violated antitrust
laws. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372 (D.NJ. 1952).
Plaintiff removed price-fixing provisions from the license, and the complaint was rein-
stated, but relief was denied by the district court's finding that the patents were invalid
as to two claims. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 116 F. Supp. 759 (D.N.J.
1953). An appeal to the circuit court was dismissed until the validity of all the claims
was determined by the district court. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 218
F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1955). The district court found all the claims invalid. Newburgh
Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 136 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1955).
6. The court reversed the district court as to the invalidity of one of the patent
claims, but nevertheless denied relief. Instant case at 294.
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) : "Every contract, combination... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states.. .is hereby de-
clared to be illegal."
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have power... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .. .Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective. . .Discoveries. . . ." See REPORT oF THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAi's NATIONAL CoMMrrt' To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 224 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as REPORT) ; WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 18-21 (1942).
9. REPORT at 1; SCHWART, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 3, 5
(1952).
10. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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principle was established that, where a patentee licenses his patented prod-
uct to other manufacturers, it is within the scope of the patent-and thus
not an antitrust violation-for the patentee to fix the selling price of such
product by the licensees,"' "provided the conditions of sale are normally
and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's
monopoly." 2 The Court reasoned that without this right in the patentee,
a licensee could "affect the price at which . . . [the-patentee could] sell
his own patented goods," thereby reducing the patentee's profit and impair-
ing the value of his monopoly.3 The Court held that setting prices for a
licensee, who together with General Electric controlled eighty-five per cent
of the market in electric lamps, 14 was within the patent reward, but did
not state the standards upon which it based this conclusion. More than
twenty years later, in United States v. Line Material Co.,15 a divided Court
found that cross-licenses of dependent patents 16 fixing the price to be
charged for the patented product was not permitted by the General Electric
doctrine, and therefore constituted a Sherman Act violation.17 The Court
construed the latter case as supporting the right of a patentee "to license
another to make and vend at a fixed price," Is but not as enabling the
patentee "to combine with other patent owners to fix prices on articles
covered by the respective patents." 19 In United States v. United States
Gypsum Co.,20 where only one patentee was involved but where the Court
found an industry-wide conspiracy to control the market among "all
former competitors in an entire industry," 21 the fact that patent licensing
11. Such horizontal price-fixing must be distinguished from fixing the resale price
of the patented articles, which is beyond the scope of the patent grant. Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913).
It is also outside the scope of the patent grant for a patentee to fix the sale price of
unpatented products produced by a patented machine or a patented process. Cummer-
Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Barber Col-
man Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943). But see Straight Side
Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 82 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1936). Although the instant
case involves a patented process, it is akin to the line of decisions dealing with patented
products rather than to those involving the unpatented products of patented processes,
since the licenses in question fixed the price of imparting the finish on the textile by the
patented process but did not fix the price of the finished cloth.
12. 272 U.S. at 490. The Court relied on Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S.
70 (1902). Although the Beinent case was the first to allow horizontal patent license
price-fixing, the doctrine was not articulated until the General Electric case.
13. 272 U.S. at 490.
14. Other licensees of General Electric, not parties to the suit, controlled 8% of
the remaining electric lamp market. Id. at 481. The Court did not state whether prices
of the other licensees were also fixed.
15. 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
16. Dependent patents are non-infringing patents, a basic patent and an improve-
ment patent, neither of which can be commercially marketed without the other. Cross-
licensing allows both the owner of the basic patent and the owner of the improvement
patent to market the combination in its cormmercially-feasible form.
17. 333 U.S. at 312.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. Four concurring Justices voted to overrule General Electric. Id. at 315-16.
20. 333 U.S. at 364.
21. Id. at 401. In the second Gypsum case, United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 340 U.S. 76, 85 (1950), the Court specifically avoided the issue of whether the
price-fixing through licensing of "a mere plurality" of the members of an industry
violated the Sherman Act.
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was the price-fixing vehicle did not prevent a finding that the Sherman
Act had been violated. 2 The same conclusion was reached in United States
v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,2 where "substantially all" members of the industry
had conspired to fix prices through patent licensing.2 4 - Thus, following
New Wrinkle, the law apparently was that a patentee may set prices through
licenses so long as the licensing arrangements do not constitute a concerted
attempt to control the market or involve cross-licensing by patentees. 25
The instant case considers whether, absent these conditions, price-fixing
licenses granted by a patentee to a plurality of the members of an industry
violate the Sherman Act. The lower court, construing Line Material as
limiting General Electric to permit patentee price-fixing only of a single
licensee,2 6 found that price-fixing licenses involving more than one licensee
are illegal on the theory that the patent grant should be strictly construed
and patentees should be governed by the general rule that horizontal price-
fixing is illegal per se.2 7 The instant court, without disapproving the lower
court's analysis of General Electric, held that fixing the prices of a plurality
of the members of an industry "transcended the authority of the General
Electric decision." 28
Since the facts of the instant case do not show either an anti-com-
petitive conspiracy among "substantially all" the members of an industry
or cross-licensing by patentees, the result is a new limitation on the
General Electric doctrine. The lower court's position, not overruled by the
instant court, that General Electric validated price-fixing only for one
licensee,29 is based on a misreading of the Line Material case, a fair
interpretation of which would construe "another" as an indefinite number
rather than only "one" other 30 But conceding the court's interpretation
of General Electric, testing the legality of patent license price-fixing solely
on the basis of the number of producers licensed is inadequate. While there
is a difference between price-fixing one licensee and price-fixing multiple
licensees, in that price-fixing in the latter situation limits competition not
only between the patentee and the licensees but also between licensees,31
the fact that licensees are incidentally protected from competition with
22. 333 U.S. at 400.
23. 342 U.S. 371 (1952).
24. Id. at 374.
25. See REPORT at 233-35. Two cases have upheld patent license price-fixing con-
sistent with this position. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bulldog Elec. Products Co.,
179 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1950) ; Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 676 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
26. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D.N.J.
1952).
27. Id. at 376. Price-fixing by non-patentees is a per se violation, i.e., it is con-
clusively presumed to be illegal, thus precluding the usual examination into the reason-
ableness of the restraint of trade. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
28. Instant case at 294.
29. See text at notes 26 and 28 supra.
30. See text and citations at notes 18 and 19 supra. See also REPORT at 233-35;
VAUGHANI, THn UNIUD STATXS PATNT SYSTI[ 134 (1956).
31. See Hollabaugh, Patents and Antitrust Laws, 25 U. CIN. L. Riv. 43, 66 (1956);
Rogers, Price Control Under Patent Agreements, 12 U. PiTT. L. Riv. 569, 576 (1951).
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each other would seem consistent with other judicially-accepted patent
practices. For example, exclusive area licensing, authorized by the Patent
Act,32 limits price competition between licensees by preventing one licensee
from selling in the market area of another. Also, a patentee may charge
royalties calculated to equate licensees' costs and thus narrow the zone
in which licensees can engage in price competition with each other. Fur-
thermore, a test for the permissible scope of patent license price-fixing
which focuses only on the number of licensees fails to take into account
the quantum of competition destroyed by the price-fixing arrangement.
The consuming public is more likely to be injured by the lack of competition
occasioned by a dominant patentee price-fixing a single dominant licensee,
thereby controlling the major portion of a market, than by the reduction
in competition occasioned by a patentee price-fixing two small-scale
licensees.
Regardless of these considerations, the premise of the General Electric
case, that at least some price-fixing in patent licenses is compatible with both
patent and antitrust policy, is itself subject to attack. In order to promote
invention and disclosure of invention,as the law allows the patentee to
protect his patent by extracting royalties from his licensees.3 4 A manufac-
turer who would be able with the patent license to produce the patented
invention at a cost lower than that of the patentee, but who without the
patent license would have higher costs in producing an alternative product,
is theoretically willing to pay a royalty equal to the estimated total cost
advantage that the license would give him over the patentee. A patentee
can thus charge royalties not only as compensation for his creative idea
and to return his research and development costs, but also to protect
his inefficiency in the utilization of unpatented factors of production such
as managerial ability, labor output and materials acquisition.3 5 As a prac-
tical matter, however, the amount of royalty that will equate the patentee's
and his licensees' costs of producing the patented article may not be capable
of exact determination,"6 thereby permitting some measure of price com-
petition on the basis of efficiency in unpatented production factors among
the patentee and the licensees. When the patentee imposes price-fixing
provisions in his patent licenses in order to guarantee the protection of un-
patented cost factors, he denies to the consuming public even the limited
competitive benefits engendered by whatever price flexibility remains from
the imperfection of cost-calculated royalties. Price-fixing lessens the
licensee's incentive to improve existing technology or invent cheaper alter-
natives to the patented product, for the prospect of wider profit margins
through cost reductions at an existing fixed price is necessarily a weaker
stimulus than is survival among cost-conscious producers competing on the
32. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952).
33. See note 8 supra.
34. REPORT at 233. Royalty payments are consideration for the patent license.
35. Id. at 235-36 (dissent of Louis B. Schwartz).
36. BROWN, CosTs AND PRICES 199 (1953): "[T]he assignment of all costs to
products can rarely, if ever, be made on an accurate basis." See id. at 201, 203. For
methods of allocating cost, see MATz, Curay & FRANK, COST AccOUNTING (1952).
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basis of price. The inducement of assured profit margins through price-
fixing, when offered by a patentee to a prospective licensee, is likely to result
in many patents remaining unchallenged in court that otherwise would be
declared invalidV Moreover, the power to fix prices appears immaterial
as an incentive to invent, for many large corporations are constrained to
invent and to disclose invention at the risk of being preempted by a patent
secured by a competitor.3 8  Price-fixing in patent licenses thus serves
neither patent nor antitrust policy, and the decision in the instant case
is justified.
Fair Trade-
"FREE AND OPEN COMPETITION" FOUND DESPITE
INDUSTRY-WIDE PRICE MATCHING AND FAIR
TRADING; COMBINATION INCLUDING OTHERWISE
NON-FAIR TRADED ARTICLES AND PRODUCTS OF
OTHER MANUFACTURERS HELD "COMMODITY"
SUBJECT TO FAIR TRADE
Eastman Kodak Company sought a permanent injunction under the
Maryland Fair Trade Act 1 to prevent defendant discount house from
selling Kodak products, including camera "outfits," at less than the fair
trade prices. Defendant resisted the injunction, contending that Eastman's
products were not "in free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others," because the photo-
graphic market was preempted by fair-traded products whose manufacturers
followed a policy of price matching. Defendant also maintained that East-
man was illegally fair trading its camera outfits because they contained,
besides a camera and film individually fair traded, a flash holder manu-
factured but not otherwise fair traded by plaintiff, and batteries and flash
bulbs manufactured and trade-marked by others. The district court,
finding Eastman's products to be in free and open competition, granted an
injunction covering all fair-traded articles except the camera outfits. 2 On
appeal the circuit court affirmed the finding of free and open competition
on the grounds that Eastman did not have a monopoly on any of the articles
involved and that the existence of blanket price matching and fair trading
37. Witness the tendency to settle such suits when the patentee offers a price-fixing
license, as in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
38. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEME 12 (1956); HAMILTON,
PATENTS AND Fmn ENTERPRISE 139-40 (TNEC Monograph No. 31, 1941). As a result
of the corporate struggle for patent supremacy, the inventing process has shifted from
the individual's laboratory to the corporate research departments, where experimenters
assign their patents in advance to their employers. VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra at 282-85;
HAMILTON, op. cit. mtpra at 155. See generally Potts v. Coe, 145 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir.
1944).
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 102-10 (1951).
2. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Utilities Co., 138 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1956).
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in the industry was inconclusive as proof of a lack of competition. The
injunction, however, was extended to include Eastman's camera outfits.3
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Utilities Co., 234 F.2d 766 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 352 U.S. 821 (1956).
The purpose of state fair trade laws 4 is to protect a manufacturer's
good will 5 from injury through price cutting 6 in the sale of his identified
products. These statutes enable a vendor,7 at his option, to fix resale
prices 8 within the state for a commodity 9 which bears, or the label or
container of which bears, a trade-mark, brand or name.10 However, the
commodity must be in free and open competition with commodities of the
same general class produced or distributed by others, and the resale price-
fixing may not involve horizontal agreements between competing manu-
facturers or distributors." Federal legislation authorizing the application
of these laws to commodities moving in interstate commerce contains similar
conditions.'2 Two significant problems in interpretation of the fair trade
laws are presented by the instant case: the meaning of "free and open com-
petition," and the status of combinations of articles as distinct "com-
modities" for purposes of fair trading.
3. A third ground of defense, that Eastman was barred from relief by its failure to
use reasonable diligence in enforcing its fair-trade agreements, was rejected by both
courts. Id. at 670-74; instant case at 771-72.
4. See Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183,
194-96 (1936). See generally Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CHI. L. REv.
175, 184-86 (1954); Mermey, Fair Trade: The Fundamental Issues, 1 -ANTITRUST
BULL. 125 (1955).
5. "Good will" in this context is of two kinds: "[T]he goodwill of satisfied cus-
tomers that results in repeated purchases over long periods of time, and the goodwill of
satisfied wholesalers and retailers that is evidenced by willingness to handle a particular
brand because it is saleable in volume at prices reasonably satisfactory to both dealers
and consumers, or because it gives promise of becoming so with increased develop-
ment of consumer demand." FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 6 (1945).
6. The injuries to the manufacturer commonly alleged to result from retail price
cutting and the use of loss leaders are: (1) consumers' attitudes toward the product
may be adversely affected with a resultant lowering of their estimates of the quality
of the product, and there may be an unsettling of their buying and consuming
habits so as to shift purchases to competitive brands or produce a decrease in total
consumption; (2) price wars will eliminate some dealers and antagonize others, en-
couraging them to substitute competing brands; (3) after having lowered the normal
retail price level, dealers will insist on lower wholesale prices in order to allow a
reasonable profit margin at the reduced level. See GRETHER, Pxuc CONTROL UNDER
FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 264-69 (1939).
7. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6711 (1949). These laws permit a distributor, as
well as a manufacturer, to establish resale prices. A large number of fair trade laws
permit only the owner of the trade-mark, brand, or specified name, or a distributor
specifically authorized by such an owner, to establish such fair-trade prices. See, e.g.,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 103 (1951).
8. Some fair trade laws contemplate the establishment of an absolute price, see, e.g.,
CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE ANN. § 16902 (West 1954). Others provide for the establish-
ment of a minimum price. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 103 (1951).
9. A "commodity" is generally defined in these acts as "any subject of commerce."
See, e.g., id. § 102(A).
10. See, e.g., id. § 103.
11. See, e.g., id. §§ 103, 108.
12. Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), amending 26
STAT. 209 (1890) ; McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (2) (1952), amend-
ing 38 STAT. 719 (1914).
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In permitting manufacturers to set resale prices, consequently eliminat-
ing price competition between distributors, fair trading may result in
artificially high prices for consumers. As a check on excessive prices, fair
trade statutes include a requirement that fair-traded commodities be in
"free and open competition." 13 However, legislative history gives little
indication of the competitive criteria envisaged by this provision.14  Exist-
ing cases establish that a monopolist is precluded from fair trading on the
theory that a monopoly product, by definition, is not in "free and open
competition." 15 While the statutes themselves expressly prohibit horizontal
pricing agreements,' 0 it has been held where the fair-traded goods did
not substantially preempt the market that uniform prices do not constitute
a lack of "free and open competition." 17 The instant case involves the right
to fair trade where there is industry-wide fair trading combined with a
practice of price matching. The existence of price matching does not, in
itself, show the state of competition in an industry.'8 As has been demon-
strated in practice, price matching may sometimes accompany active price
competition,' 9 but it may also be symptomatic of attempts to avoid such
competition.20  In the former situation, since prices reflect changes in
market conditions and any uniformity resulting from price matching is
temporary only,21 there is little danger of excessive prices and there would
appear to be "free and open competition." On the other hand, where
13. Senator Tydings, discussing'the Miller-Tydings bill, stated that its purpose was
to permit a manufacturer to fix retail prices provided, ". . .and this 'provided' is
mountain high-that the article about which the contract is written is in free and open
competition with other articles." 81 CoNG. Rsc. 7495 (1937). This view has received
judicial approval, U.S. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 317 (1956) (dis-
senting opinion) ; Schwegmann Bros. v. Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 856 (1953).
14. For a summary of the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Act, see 1
TOULMIN, ANITI-TkusT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES c. 9 (1949) ; for the McGuire
Act, see U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2181 (1952).
15. Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 330 U.S.
828 (1947) ; Ronson Patents Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 676 (E.D.
Mo. 1953).
16. See note 11 supra.
17. Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939). The opinion states
that "in some instances. . . [the products which are fair traded at similar prices] are
also in competition with unpatented products. . ." sold for the same purposes. Id. at
167, 4 S.E.2d at 532. It is not apparent whether the unpatented products were also
fair traded, but the substantial uniformity of prices evidently involved only the pat-
ented products. To the extent that the patented, fair-traded products lacked substi-
tutes, it would seem that the case is in conflict with the cases in note 15 supra.
18. See REPoR oF THE ATToRNxy GtNnRAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY
TH. ANTITRUST LAWS 331-32 (1955) (hereinafter cited as REPORT). For a discussion
of the problems of measuring price rigidity, see STIGLa, THE THEORY OF PRicF 277-80
(1952).
19. Active competition requires that competitors meet, or offer an equivalent for,
any superior inducement which one of them offers. To the extent that competing prod-
ucts are not differentiated in the minds of consumers, A cannot sell his goods unless he
meet B's price. See RnroRT at 331.
20. Where each seller knows in advance that any price reduction will be met
immediately by all other sellers, there is no incentive tb compete in price since it would
be to no one's advantage to make the first move. Id. at 331.
21. Id. at 331-32.
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price matching implements an anti-competitive price policy, the commodity's
general price level is relatively unresponsive to changes in demand 2 and
individual prices remain substantially uniform despite varying efficiencies
of producers. 23 This occurs frequently in oligopolistic industries where
manufacturers prefer to rely on forms of non-price competition 24 less
readily countered by rivals than price reduction.m2 5 When fair trading and
non-competitive price matching are thus combined, price competition is
eliminated at both the distributive and manufacturing levels. Although
change in demand, production efficiency and new entrants remain as
potential forces for price competition, it is doubtful if the protection of
good will justifies fair trading in these circumstances. While the instant
court correctly found price matching per se inconclusive proof of the lack
of "free and open competition," a proper inquiry would have included an
examination of the factors underlying the existence of price matching in the
photographic equipment industry. A finding that price matching reflects
a successful industry-wide effort to avoid price competition should lead
to the conclusion that "free and open competition" did not exist.
The right of a manufacturer to fair trade combinations which include
either products of his own that are not fair traded when sold individually,
26
or products manufactured and trade-marked by others but not fair traded
by them,2 7 or both, has been dealt with in only one prior case, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Siegel,2 8 which also involved Eastman's camera outfits. In
that case, Eastman's applications for preliminary 29 and permanent in-
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Non-price competition generally takes the form of product variation, advertising
and other types of sales promotion.
25. See BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMNT 202-03 (1948) ; STIGLtR,
THE THEORY OF PRICE 232, 283 (1952).
26. Judicial construction, influenced by the permissive nature of the fair trade
laws, has established the right to fair trade selectively from a number of related com-
modities bearing the same trade-mark. General Elec. Co. v. Federal Employees Dis-
tributing Co., 45 Cal. 2d 891, 892-93, 291 P.2d 942, 943 (1955) ; General Elec. Co. v.
S. Klein-on-the-Square, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d 37, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Krupsaw v. Luskin,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) If68288 (D. Md. Feb. 14, 1956), while
affirming the general principle, denied injunctive relief to the fair trader because of evi-
dence that his fair-traded, branded commodities were indistinguishable by the public
from his numerous nonfair-traded, branded commodities. In holding that fair trading
could not legitimately be employed under these circumstances, the court established
what appears a reasonable limitation on a manufacturer's discretion as to which of his
commodities he will fair trade, i.e., he may not create a situation where the numbers
and similar marketing conditions of the nonfair-traded commodities would make it
unreasonable to suppose that his good will is protected by resale price maintenance for
the fair-traded commodities.
27. Where a combination contains products trade-marked and independently fair
traded by the producer of the combination and also products trade-marked and inde-
pendently fair-traded by another manufacturer, it can be argued that it is illegal for
the producer of the combination to fair trade it at a price equal to the sum of the fair
trade prices of the components, since this would amount to horizontal price fixing
which is specifically forbidden by the fair trade laws. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Siegel, 150 N.Y.S.2d 99, 113 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
28. 207 Misc. 283, 136 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct.); 207 Misc. 986, 140 N.Y.S.2d 260
(Sup. Ct. 1955); 150 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct.), modified and aff'd, 1 App. Div. 2d
1001, 151 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep't 1956), 69 HARV. L. REV. 385 (1956).
29. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 207 Misc. 283, 136 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct
1955).
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junctions 30 were denied in the lower courts on the ground that its attempt
to give fair-trade protection to the "foreign" and otherwise nonfair-traded
components was inconsistent with the equitable protection of its own good
will. 31  The appellate court,3 2 however, held that the only question was
whether the combination was a "commodity" within the meaning of the
statute, which in turn depended solely upon its being an "article of com-
merce" as defined by the statute; 3 since the kit was in fact an article of
commerce, it was necessarily a proper subject of fair trade. While this
standard is clear and definite it ignores the statutory purpose, since it would
permit a manufacturer to enjoy fair-trade protection for a combination
whose marketability results not from his own good will but from that of
the manufacturer of some component thereof; and it would give the right
to protect, when sold in a combination, an article that is not protected when
sold separately, although the good will attached to that article may be
involved in both situtations. The instant court3 4 investigated market
reaction to the combination and concluded from the attitudes of consumers,
retailers and wholesalers that the combination "possessed a functional unity
apart from [the] component parts." 3 5 Market reaction to a combination
indicates whether there exists the good will that the statute is designed to
protect, and thus provides a workable method for determining whether there
is a legitimate basis for fair trading. Where the kit has acquired an identity
and utility of its own, and the components no longer retain independent
significance for the consumer, the fact that a component bearing the manu-
facturer's trade-mark is not individually fair traded would not show that
the manufacturer was inconsistent in protecting his good will in that
component, since no independent good will attaches to the component as
part of the combination." Similarly, there would appear no valid ob-
30. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 150 N.Y.S2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
31. The court determined, from Eastman's failure to fair trade separately all
the components of its manufacture which were included in the outfits that Eastman did
not really intend to protect its good will and, therefore, that the outfits, were not proper
subjects of fair trade. The court added by way of dictum that whether "foreign" com-
ponents precluded the fair trading of a combination depending on whether the par-
ticular "foreign" component was an operating part, such as a radio tube, or an accessory
with a brand name of independent significance.
32. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Siegel, 1 App. Div. 2d 1001, 161 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep't
1956).
33. N.Y. GmN. Bus. LAW § 369.
34. The lower court in the instant case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Home Utilities Co.,
138 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1956), although it mentioned the "commodity" concept with
respect to the "foreign" components, based its denial of an injunction on the decision of
the first court to consider the Siegel case, which held that the attempt to give fair-
trade protection to the nonfair-traded and "foreign" components "frustrated" the
legislative purpose of protecting good will. See text at note 31 supra.
35. Instant case at 774.
36. It should be noted that the flash holder included in the Eastman outfits was not
in free and open competition with other flash holders when first introduced, and thus
could not be independently fair traded during that period. See Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Home Utilities Co., 138 F. Supp. 670, 674 n.4 (D. Md. 1956). Nevertheless, a legitimate
basis for fair trading the combination remained so long as the combination was re-
garded as a distinct commodity in the market, and the flash holder held no separate
identity. In this situation, the requirement that the combination be in free and open
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jection to the inclusion of the "foreign" components. Since consumers rely
on the manufacturer's name in making their purchases, the "foreign" com-
ponents are, in effect, regarded as his products also, and the fact that fair
trading the combination will indirectly create a protected market for another
nonfair-trading manufacturer would seem of secondary importance. It
should be noted, however, that merely because a combination has an iden-
tity and a utility of its own, the components have not necessarily lost their
own independent identities and utilities. For example, if it could have
been shown in the instant case that most purchasers of the Eastman kits
were professional photographers who preferred the Eastman kit over
competing kits because of the Eastman flash holder, then it could be said
that the flash holder had retained independent significance. In that case fair
trading would be improper because the manufacturer would be inconsistent
in protecting his good will in the flash holder.
3 7
Federal Jurisdiction-
ENFORCEMENT OF ALLEGEDLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
ORDINANCE ENJOINED BY FEDERAL COURT ON
SHOWING OF MERE POTENTIALITY OF MULTIPLE
PROSECUTIONS AND INABILITY TO RECOVER
DISPUTED LICENSE FEES
A Carrollton, Georgia ordinance 1 required any person engaging locally
in labor organizing to obtain a license costing $1,000 plus $100 for each
day that such activity was carried on. The penalty for failure to comply
was a $100 fine or sixty days imprisonment or both. Plaintiff labor
competition with other similar outfits would indirectly afford consumer protection from
the excessive prices Eastman might have been able to obtain for the flash holder while
it remained an exclusive product.
37. Another general problem which may be presented by the attempt to fair trade
a combination is that of abandonment. Where a manufacturer offers a combination of
two or more of his products at less than the total of their individual fair-trade prices,
some courts have held the pricing to be inconsistent and a relinquishment by the manu-
facturer of his right to fair trade the individual articles. Frank Fischer Merchandising
Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 105, 19 A.2d 454 (Ch. 1941) ; Bathasweet Corp.
v. Weissbard, 128 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337 (Ch. 1940). Other courts have found
such practices to be within the purview of fair trade law. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v.
Hogue and Knott Super Market, 1955 Trade Cas. 1167989 (W.D. Tenn.); Weco
Products Co. v. Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 1940-43 Trade Cas. 1110044 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1940).
Since the rationale of abandonment is that the manufacturer has permitted damage
to his good will by enabling the public to purchase his products at less than their
individual fair-trade prices, evidence of market reaction as employed in the instant case
is again relevant. Where the public regards the combination as a distinct commodity,
it can be sold at a reduced price without impairing the separate good will attached to
its components. In all other situations, with the possible exception of promotional
combinations offered for a limited time, inconsistent pricing would properly be held to
constitute an abandonment.
1. See instant case at 482 n.1.
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organizer sought to organize certain employees within the city and, on
inquiry to the local officials, was told that the ordinance would be enforced.
To object to the ordinance's constitutionality in the state courts, plaintiff
had the alternative of paying the license fee and then bringing an action
to recover the payment or defending a criminal prosecution for violation
of the ordinance. Instead, plaintiff sued in the federal district court to
enjoin enforcement of the ordinance on the ground that it violated the
Federal Constitution. The district court, finding that plaintiff had failed
to show impending irreparable injury, refused to exercise its equity
jurisdiction. However, the circuit court reversed, holding that the pos-
sibility that plaintiff *vould be unable to recover the license payment in a
civil suit, combined with the danger that separate prosecutions might be
initiated for each day's violation of the ordinance, constituted irreparable
injury. Denton v. Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).
It is basic policy of the federal courts to refuse to interfere by injunc-
tion with the enforcement of state law.2  However, when proceedings have
not been initiated in a state court 3 federal courts may enjoin enforcement
of a state statute for violation of the Federal Constitution if there is a show-
ing of irreparable injury.4 Such injury has been found where an in-
dividual, in order to test the constitutionality of a state statute, must risk
great financial loss,5 be subject to excessive penalties 05 or suffer the threat
of multiple prosecutions.7 Thus, in Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction
Co.,8 the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of federal equity jurisdiction
where a state tax statute provided for summary collection and the tax-
payer might have been unable to recover his payment should the law have
been declared unconstitutional. Federal intervention was also upheld in
Graves v. Texas Co.,9 where a taxpayer had the choice of paying a tax
and, if the statute were held unconstitutional, being required to bring
several suits at much expense to himself in order to recover the sum, or, in
the alternative, defending a collection suit at the risk of a penalty of twenty-
five per cent of the tax due should the statute have been upheld. The Court
2. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162-64 (1943) ; Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 49-50 (1941).
3. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) ; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 162 (1908).
4. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S.
445 (1927); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
5. Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) ; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction
Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
6. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
7. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917).
8. 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
9. 298 U.S. 393 (1936). See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ($2,500
cost of fishing license not recoverable should act be unconstitutional; penalty for
violation of fishing law of $1,000 fine, one year imprisonment, or combination of
$500 fine and year's imprisonment) ; Comment, Irreparable Injury in Constitutional
Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 255, 258 (1936). In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943) ($100 fine or imprisonment up to thirty days was not found excessive for failure
to obtain a ten dollar soliciting license) and in Speilman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge,
295 U.S. 89 (1935) ($500 fine for failure to comply with a code of fair competition
was found not excessive).
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has also found irreparable injury where multiple prosecutions have been
threatened. For example, in Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co.,'
six informations, each carrying potential fine and imprisonment, had been
filed against a securities dealer who refused to comply with a state blue
sky law claimed to be unconstitutional, and it was alleged that there would
be further prosecutions. The district court's finding of irreparable injury
was upheld, although the Court reversed on the constitutional issue. A
mere declaration of intention to enforce a statute has not been a sufficient
threat of multiple prosecutions to support a finding of irreparable injury."
However, if it is reasonable to infer from past actions of the prosecuting
authorities that further prosecutions will ensue,12 or aodistrict attorney has
called a grand jury for the express purpose of bringing further prosecu-
tions,'" the Supreme Court has upheld the exercise of federal equity
jurisdiction.
The possibility of plaintiff's not recovering the license fee, had he paid
it, seemed real in the instant case 14 and would ordinarily have been a
proper ground for finding irreparable injury,15 but here plaintiff was not
limited to paying the license fee and suing for recovery. He had the
alternative of suffering criminal prosecution without risk of what has
heretofore been considered an "excessive" punishment. 1 6  The court, ap-
parently recognizing this, relied on the threat of multiple prosecutions to
support its holding.' 7 Nevertheless, in all prior cases where multiple
prosecution has been the ground for irreparable injury, the required
"threat" has been more than a mere possibility but has amounted to the
actual initiation of a number of prosecutions 's or overt acts showing such
an intention on the part of the prosecuting authorities. 19 According to
this standard, it would appear that the instant court's position was not
justified since the only basis for inferring a threat of multiple prosecutions
was the potentiality 20 that plaintiff could have been prosecuted separately
10. 242 U.S. 559 (1917).
11. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941): "A general statement that an
officer stands ready to perform his duty falls far short of such a threat as would war-
rant the interference of equity. And this is especially true where there is a complete
absence of any showing of a definite and expressed intent to enforce particular clauses
of a broad, comprehensive and multi-provisioned statute. For such a general statement
is not the equivalent of a threat that prosecutions are to be begun so immediately, and
in such numbers... as to indicate the virtual certainty of that extraordinary injury
which alone justifies equitable suspension of proceedings in criminal courts."
12. Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564 (1917): "Six
informations have already been filed against appellees and as many more may be
brought as there may be violations of the statute."
13. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
14. See instant case at 486.
15. See text following note 8 supra.
16. The potential penalties under the ordinance in the instant case, $100 fine or
sixty days, are quite similar to those found not excessive in Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) ($100 fine or imprisonment up to thirty days).
17. See instant case at 486.
18. See text at note 13 supra.
19. See text and citation at note 12 supra.
20. But see Brief for Appellants, p. 20, where it is stated that counsel for the city
"refused to deny" that prosecutions for each day's violation would occur and refused
to make a test case of a single violation unless plaintiff would refrain from further
organizing.
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for each day's violation, together with the statements of the city officials
that the ordinance would be enforced.21  The result, however, might be
rationalized on the basis of its labor context.2* Timing is important in
labor organizing,23 and if the ordinance enabled local officials effectively to
delay such activity despite possible unconstitutionality, federal intervention
may have been appropriate. But short of harassment by multiple prosecu-
tion, which itself would authorize federal intervention,2 4 it does not appear
that the ordinance affords a vehicle for such delay. Under Georgia law
violations of licensing statutes are not enjoinable unless they constitute
a public nuisance,25 and it does not appear that labor organizing activity
would qualify as such. 6 Furthermore, organizers could not be im-
prisoned pending final determination of the constitutional issue.2 7  Not-
withstanding, the court may have reasoned that the prevailing attitude
toward labor unions in the South 2 8 made harassing tactics inevitable in the
instant case. If such was the court's position, it may have been justified in
its result; 29 however, were such reasons articulated future application of
the ease could be more easily limited to its facts. Otherwise, the case could
be said to hold that the mere potentiality of multiple prosecution is suffi-
cient to allow federal intervention in local criminal administration. This
would seem an unwarranted extension of federal equity jurisdiction, con-
trary to the express policy of the Supreme Court.30
21. See instant case at 483.
22. See AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946), where the Court found irreparable
injury apparently on the grounds that a statewide system of collective bargaining
would be disrupted by threatened enforcement of an amendment to the state constitution
which prohibited closed shop agreements between employers and unions. The dissent
pointed out that the constitutional questions could be determined in any of the actions
which might arise out of the amendment without the risk of excessive penalties or
multiple prosecutions.
23. See BARBASH, LABOR UNIONS IN ACTION 17-22 (1948). "Here the element of
timeliness is especially important. Organization can be effectively carried on only when
interest among workers is ripe and grievances are fresh." Brief for Appellants, p. 20.
24. See text at note 11 supra.
25. Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921). GA. CoDn ANN. § 72-202
(1949) authorizes the solicitor general of the judicial circuit to seek an injunction
against public nuisances.
26. GA. CODM ANN. § 72-102 (1949): "Nuisances are either public or private. A
public nuisance is one which damages all persons who come within the sphere 6f its
operation, though it may vary in its effect on individuals. . . ." Practicing as a chiro-
practor without a license, Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792 (1921), and loaning
money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, State ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv.
Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S.E.2d 574 (1940), have been held not to constitute public nuisances.
But operating a gambling house, Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538, 150 S.E.
825 (1929), a lewd house, Brindle v. Copeland, 145 Ga. 398, 89 S.E. 332 (1916), or a
motion picture theatre on Sunday, Forehand v. Moody, 200 Ga. 166, 36 S.E.2d 321
(1945), in violation of law, have been held to be enjoinable as public nuisances. The
issue as to whether labor organizing activities without a license would constitute a
public nuisance has not been judicially determined, but it is doubtful that the same
conduct which is perfectly legal when done with a license could be said to damage all
persons who come within its sphere when done without a license. See Dean v. State,
supra.
27. GA. Cong ANN. § 27-901 (1953) : "At no time, either before the commitment
court, when indicted, after a motion for a new trial is made, or while a bill of excep-
tions is pending, shall any person charged with a misdemeanor be refused bail."
28. See REYNOLDS, LBOR EcoNoMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 53-54 (1954).
29. Cf. AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
30. See text at notes 2 and 11 supra.
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Self-Incrimination-
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION DENIED
IN DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDING
Defendant immigrant was naturalized in 1925. In 1952 the United
States filed a petition under the Nationality Act of 1940 1 to cancel his cer-
tificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud in its procurement. 2  At
the trial defendant refused to take the witness stand, claiming the fifth
amendment privilege that ". .. [no person] shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." 3 The district court,
observing that application of this privilege to a denaturalization proceeding
was "sensitive and uncharted ground," compelled defendant to testify so
that the appellate court could have a complete record. United States v.
Costello, 144 F. Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
A proceeding which is not an ordinary criminal prosecution may be
treated as a "criminal" case for the purpose of an accused's privilege under
the fifth amendment not to take the stand to testify against himself.4 The
Supreme Court reversed the denial of the privilege in Boyd v. United
States,5 where the United States sued for forfeiture of property under
the customs laws, and in Lees v. United States," where defendant was
subject to a $1,000 penalty for allegedly violating an alien labor statute.
In these cases the Court justified its action on the theory that forfeiture
and penalty were in the nature of criminal punishments regardless of the
labels attached to the proceedings. Other courts have refused to apply
this reasoning to disbarment 7 or deportation proceedings," holding that
disbarment is merely a means of protecting the courts and the public from
persons unfit to practice as attorneys,9 while deportation is only a civil
proceeding to "expel the alien from a place where he has no right to be,
and to send him back where he belongs." -1 The instant court is the first
to consider whether the defendant in a denaturalization proceeding is
entitled to the privilege. The Nationality Act of 1906 authorized the
1. C. 876, § 338, 54 STAT. 1158. The suit to cancel defendant's naturalization was
commenced before the effective date of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
66 STAT. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1952).
2. Defendant had allegedly failed to reveal a prior arrest in his application for
naturalization.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
4. The privilege of an accused not to take the stand must be distinguished from
the privilege of a witness to refuse to answer a question that may tend to incriminate
him. Compare 8 WIGMORZ, EVIDWNCg §§ 2190-95 (3d ed. 1940), with 8 id. §§ 2250-84.
While the instant case concerns the former aspect of the fifth amendment privilege, the
analysis would apply equally to the latter.
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
7. E.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In re Spicer, 126 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1942).
8. E.g., United States ex rel. Zapp v. Director of Immigration, 120 F.2d 762 (2d
Cir. 1941) ; United States ex rel. Rennie v. Brooks, 284 Fed. 908 (E.D. Mich. 1922).
But cf. Petrowicz v. Holland, 142 F. Supp. 369, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1956), quoted at note 29
infra.
9. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1882).
10. United States v. Hung Chang, 134 Fed. 19, 25 (6th Cir. 1904).
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United States district attorneys to institute proceedings to cancel a cer-
tificate of citizenship where it was illegally procured." It was early estab-
lished that such a proceeding was analogous to a bill in equity to revoke or
set aside a grant of land or patent, or to cancel and vacate a judgment,
and was not triable by jury.1 2 Although it has been held that the federal
criminal statute of limitations does not apply to denaturalization proceed-
ings,13 and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do apply, 14 certain
aspects of criminal proceedings have been acquired: issues outside the
scope of the "complaint" may not be considered; 15 testimony as to oral
admissions is received with extreme caution; 16 relevant character testi-
mony is freely admitted; 17 findings of lower courts are not weighted as
heavily as in ordinary civil suits; 1I and the Government has the burden of
proving its charges by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing [evidence]
. . . which [does not leave] . . . the issue in doubt." 9  In 1956 the
Supreme Court in United States v. Minker 20 held that an individual could
not be forced to give information which could be used to establish the
"good cause" necessary to institute denaturalization proceedings against
him,21 but the Court reached this conclusion on statutory grounds, ex-
pressly foregoing consideration of the constitutional issue.
22
While early courts treating denaturalization as a civil proceeding stated
that cancellation of a certificate of naturalization "imposes no penalties," 2
11. C. 3592, § 15, 34 STAT. 601. Prior to the passage of the Nationality Act of
1906, there was no statutory provision for denaturalization, but a court which had issued
a certificate of citizenship had the power to cancel it upon a showing by a proper party
that the certificate had been procured through fraud. Denaturalization proceedings were
originally used to launch collateral attacks upon the opposing party in civil suits where
citizenship was of some significance. See, e.g., Vaux v. Nesbit, 1 McCord Equity Rep.
204 (S.C. 1825). In 1830, however, Chief Justice Marshall in Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S.
(4 Pet.) 393 (1830), limited the impeachment of naturalization decrees to actions
undertaken solely for that purpose. Denaturalization was thereafter used as a political
weapon in order to decrease the opposition's eligible voters before election. Comment,
Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, 35 CORNL L.Q. 120, 125 (1949).
12. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913) ; United States v. Mansour,
170 Fed. 671, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
13. United States v. Brass, 37 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
14. United States v. Jerome, 16 F.R.D. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
15. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943). In the ordinary civil
case, issues outside the scope of the complaint may come in at the discretion of the court
and amendment of the complaint may be made as late as after judgment. See FXD. R.
Civ. P. 15(b). However, in criminal cases, .... conviction upon a charge not made
would be sheer denial of due process." De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937).
16. United States v. Bridges, 133 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
17. United States v. Genovese, 133 F. Supp. 820 (D.N.J. 1955). Evidence showing
the character of a party is generally inadmissible in a civil cause. 1 WIGasoaz, EviDaNCE
§ 64 (3d ed. 1940).
18. Cufari v. United States, 217 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1954).
19. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943). See also Knauer v.
United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 655
(1944).
20. 350 U.S. 179 (1956).
21. 66 STAT. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1952).
22. 350 U.S. at 190.
23. E.g., Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 24 (1913). It should be noted, how-
ever, that in Luria the Court based its dictum that denaturalization was not a penalty
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loss of citizenship renders extraordinarily severe consequences upon the
individual concerned. Besides losing incidents of citizenship such as
the right to vote or to hold public office,2 4 denaturalization may render
an individual stateless, thereby depriving him of the protection of any
government.2 5 In addition, by current policy the Attorney General seeks
to deport denaturalized citizens,-6 with the result that denaturalization
is tantamount to deportation. While deportation itself would seem suffi-
ciently severe, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the two
proceedings in respect to the requisite burden of proof. In a deportation
action the Government may prove its case by a mere preponderance of the
evidence, 27 while clear and convincing proof must be shown for denatural-
ization. 28 Although recent cases have been more insistent on procedural
fairness 2 9 in deportation, defendant's testimony may still be compelled.30
At the same time, the Supreme Court has recognized the severity of
denaturalization. 31 In United States v. Schneideran3 2 the court noted:
"In its consequences . . . [denaturalization] . . . is more serious
than a taking of one's property, or the imposition of a fine or other
penalty. For it is safe to assert that nowhere in the world today
is the right of citizenship of greater worth to an individual than it is in
this country." 33
In view of the harm to the individual from loss of citizenship and the
Supreme Court's present attitude, the instant court would have been
justified in allowing the defendant the protection of the fifth amendment.
upon United States v. Mansour, 170 Fed. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) and Johannessen v.
United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912). The strict holdings of the Manisour and Johannessen
cases were that the Nationality Act of 1906, c. 3592, § 15, 34 STAT. 601, was not ex post
facto in nature since is imposed no retroactive penalty. See also instant case at 781 n.2.
24. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV; id. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
25. See Bisnop, INTERNATIONAL LAw 464-558 (1953). See also Oster v. Rubin-
stein, 136 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), which held that a stateless person could not
seek redress in a federal court on the basis of diversity since he was not a citizen of
another state nor was he an alien.
26. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949).
27. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Ted, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
28. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
29. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (strictly construing the
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1940). But see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223
(1951) (testing whether a section of the Immigration Act of 1940 was void for vague-
ness). In the recent case of Petrowicz v. Holland, 142 F. Supp. 369, 373 (E.D. Pa.
1956), the court stated: "Since the proposed deportation order contemplates sending this
alien plaintiff behind the 'iron curtain' on the basis of a fact alleged to have occurred
approximately twenty years ago, this long time resident of the United States, having a
large family here, would seem entitled to have in her trial at least those safeguards
given to an accused in a felony case, if not those granted to an accused in a capital
case."
30. Couto v. Shaughnessy, 123 F. Supp. 926, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955).
31. United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 187-88 (1956); Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) ; Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946) ;
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) ; Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 159 (1943). See also United States v. Minker, 217 F.2d 350, 353 (3d Cir.
1954).
32. 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
33. Id. at 122.
